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CLAIMING ILLEGAL
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
AN EXAMINATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1)
For many years defendants in criminal trials who suspected that the
prosecution had relied upon illegal electronic surveillance' were stymied
in their efforts to establish the existence of such surveillance. Their
difficulty resulted from a 1939 Supreme Court opinion2 in which Justice
Frankfurter placed upon the defendant the burden of satisfying the Court
that electronic surveillance was unlawfully employed and that a substan-
tial part of the government's case derived from this surveillance. a Only
after such proof was made did the burden shift to the government to show
that its evidence had an independent source. 4 Behind this seemingly
innocuous formulation, however, lay a peculiar paradox: the coven na-
ture of electronic surveillance made the defendant's proof of the surveil-
lance virtually impossible;5 hence the burden of proof could rarely be
expected to shift.6 Only occasionally did defendants even attempt to
The term "electronic surveillance" includes both the tapping of telephone lines and
the use of electronic bugging devices. The first case in which the government admitted it had
relied upon illegal electronic surveillance was Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
2 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) (dictum). The central issue in the
case was the admissibility of evidence obtained through the use of knowledge gained from
illegally tapped conversations. The government admitted having conducted the taps. Id. at
338. See also Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1937).
3 308 U.S. at 341.
4 Id.
'The problem of establishing the occurrence of allegedly illegal electronic surveil-
lance should be distinguished from establishing the occurrence of other types of governmen-
tal searches and seizures, where the occurrence of the intrusion is likely to be unquestioned.
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 457 F.2d 63 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 864
(1972) (shotgun removed from car); Haguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968)
(search of rectal cavity for narcotics); United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944)
(removal of stolen property from house). See generally Note, Exclusion of Evidence
Obtained by Wiretapping: An lllusorySafeguard, 61 YALE L.J. 1221 (1952).
0 Knowledge of the occurrence of illegal electronic surveillance was, of course, not
foreclosed entirely. In a number of cases the government believed the surveillance to be
legal and introduced surveillance records- directly into evidence, only to have the courts
declare the surveillance illegal. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967);
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 106 (1957). In some cases the government acknowl-
edged its wrongdoing. See, e.g., Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Markis
v. United States, 387 U.S. 425 (1967). Sometimes the occurrence of the surveillance
emerged fortuitously in the course of the criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Etheridge v.
United States, 380 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1967).
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make the requisite showing to the court; never were they held to have met
their burden of proof.7
The allocation of the burdens of establishing electronic surveillance
was radically altered by the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1), part of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.8 Designed to benefit the
victims of illegal electronic surveillance, 9 section 3504(a)(1) is applica-
ble to federal trials, administrative hearings, and grand jury proceed-
ings. 10 The statute provides that
upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible
because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or because
it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act, the
opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the
alleged unlawful act. 11
Affirmance of illegal surveillance entitles a defendant to seek to exclude
its fruits, and provides a grand jury witness with a defense against any
7 See, e.g., United States v. Tanner, 279 F. Supp. 457, 479-80 (N.D. Ill. 1967)
(defendants' evidence consisted of the allegation that the importance of their case in the eyes
of the prosecutors made it likely that electronic surveillance had been used); United States
v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 165 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (defendant's evidence
consisted of (1) the allegation that the evidence in question could have been obtained in no
other way, and (2) the fact that a representative of the New York Telephone Company
appeared in court with an envelope, the contents of which he would not permit defendant's
attorney to inspect without a court order); United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), affjd on other grounds, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 909 (1955) (defendant's evidence included (1) the fact that defendants were under
observation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation prior to the indictment; (2) a statement
by a telephone technician that his examination of the telephone in question indicated that it
had been tapped; (3) the inability to get a dial tone); United States v. Frankfeld, 100 F.
Supp. 934 (D. Md. 1951) (defendants' evidence consisted of an allegation that on several
occasions they had been intercepted by men whom they believed to be F.B.I. agents at
places about which these agents could have known only through the tapping of telephone
lines). Cf. United States v. McCarthy, 292 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. VII, § 702, 84 Stat. 935 (codified in scattered sections of 18
& 28 U.S.C.) (Oct. 15, 1970). Most of the titles are of general application and do not
pertain directly to organized crime.
' See Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 84, 104 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan, sponsor).
See also Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 56 (1972).
"o See 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1970). 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970) is not applicable to
proceedings in state courts. See State v. Chaltkin, 135 N.J. Super. 179, 342 A.2d 897
(1975). See also In re Ellsberg, 446 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1971) (§ 3504(a)(1) held inapplica-
ble to federal removal proceedings).
11 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970).
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contempt charges that may be brought for his refusal to answer questions
derived from illegal electronic surveillance. 12
There is a deceptive simplicity about the procedures required by
section 3504(a)(1). Indeed, the seemingly straightforward requirement
that the government affirm or deny claims of illegal electronic surveil-
lance has itself produced considerable litigation.' 3 There is confusion
both as to the meaning of a "claim" under the statute and as to the
required scope of the government response. How the statute is interpreted
has significance both for the rights of defendants and witnesses and also
for the judicial process which must accommodate them.
This Comment will first discuss the making of claims under section
3504(a)(1), and will show that the statute should not be read to require
that claims be accompanied by evidentiary support. It will then suggest
that the statute should be read to encompass claims of attorney-third party
conversations. Finally, the scope of the government's response to section
3504(a)(I) claims will be examined.
I. CLAIMS OF ILLEGAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
Section 3504(a)(1) is a procedure for enforcing substantive rights. It
does not itself confer any new rights14 or enlarge traditional notions of
standing to object to illegally obtained evidence. 15 Section 3504(b)
defines the unlawful acts to which claims may be directed as acts involv-
ing the use of an electronic device in violation of the Constitution or of
federal law. 16 Thus defendants may claim that evidence is inadmissible
12 See pp. 635-37 infra.
"See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d
Cir. 1974); In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901 (Ist Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 942
(1974); United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fitch, 472
F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 412 U.S. 954 (1973); United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d
328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930(1972); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466 (lst Cir. 1971).
14 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970). See als In re Marcus, 491
F.2d 901, 904 (1st Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 942 (1974).
15 S. Rt'. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970). See also In re Womack, 466
F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Marx, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971).
16 ,, '[U]nlawful act' means any act the use of [sic] any electronic, mechanical, or other
device (as defined in section 2510(5) of this title) in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or any regulation or standard promulgated pursuant thereto." 18 U.S.C. §
3504(b)(1970).
HeinOnline -- 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.  634 1976
Wiretapping
because it was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment' 7 or in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).18 The latter statute bars the use of
evidence' 9 not procured in conformity with sections 2510-20,20 the
wiretap provisions of the Organized Crime and Safe Streets Act of
1968.21 Defendants whose claims of illegal surveillance are affirmed by
the government are entitled to disclosure of the contents of the surveil-
lance and a hearing to determine whether the government's evidence is
free from taint. 22
17 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Whether section 3504(a)(1) can also be used as a procedure
for the enforcement of sixth amendment rights will be discussed at pp. 646-57 infra.
18 "Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in
evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that informa-
tion would be in violation of this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
Congress intended a linkage between sections 3504(a) and 2515. The language used in
defining the types of proceedings in which 3504(a) is inapplicable was taken from 2515.
See S. RaP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970).
19 Standing to object to evidence which violates 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970) is deter-
mined in accordance with the rules for standing under the fourth amendment. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (11) (1970); S. RaP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1968).
20 Thus the effect is a codification of the exclusionary rule with respect to evidence
obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) provide extensive regulation over the use of electronic
surveillance at the federal and at the state level. Surveillance is permissible only where
certain crimes are being investigated. Furthermore, judicial approval is required. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2516, 2518(1)-(8) (1970). See also note 26 infra.
21 Pub. L. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 212 (June 19, 1968).
22 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). However, where the illegal
electronic surveillance was conducted prior to June 19, 1968, disclosure need only be made
if a judge determines that the contents "may be relevant" to a pending ciam. 18 U.S.C. §
3504(a)(2) (1970). See also In re Dellinger, 357 F. Supp. 949, 957 n.12 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
Moreover, where the event in question occurred more than five years after the date of
surveillance and the surveillance occurred before June 19, 1968, no disclosure is necessary.
18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(3) (1970). See also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013 (3rd
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 919 (1974); Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931
n.9 (7th Cir. 1973); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1248 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied.
408 U.S. 930 (1972). For discussions of possible constitutional problems raised by sections
3504(a)(2) and (a)(3), see McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or Its Critics:
Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NoRE DAME LAWYER 55 (1970); Note, Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 546 (1971).
In the case of national security electronic surveillance, disclosure is made only follow-
1976]
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Grand jury witnesses may also make claims under section
3504(a)(1). 23 Unlike defendants, however, such witnesses have no stand-
ing to complain that illegally obtained evidence violates their fourth
amendment rights. 24 Such witnesses do, however, have statutory rights
which permit them to refuse to answer questions derived from illegal
electronic surveillance. The Supreme Court held in Gelbard v. United
States25 that section 251526 provides a defense to contempt charges for
those grand jury witnesses 27 who show that the questions asked of them
were based on illegally intercepted conversations. 2 8 Following a gov-
ing a determination of its illegality in an ex parte in camera proceeding. See Giordano v.
United States, 394 U.S. 310, 314-5 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969). See also United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941,
961-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974).
23 See note 10, supra. Only a witness can raise a claim in the grand jury setting. See
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 54 (1972).
24 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
25 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
26 See notes 18-19 supra. The protection against illegal electronic surveillance af-
forded grand jury witnesses by § 2515 is less embracing than the protection defendants have
under the fourth amendment. The statute does not cover electronic surveillance conducted
in a foreign country. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1968) (by implica-
tion). See also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 279 (2d Cir. 1974). Surveillance
conducted for national security purposes is also not covered. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)
(1970). See also United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (§
2511(3) held to be a mere disclaimer of legislation in the national security area, rather than
affirmative, statutory authorization for such surveillance). It is not clear whether statutory
authorization exists for electronic surveillance conducted with the consent of one of the
parties to the conversation, or whether such surveillance is covered only by the fourth
amendment. Section 2511(2)(c) of 18 U.S.C. "sets forth types of electronic surveillance
which do not require judicial authorization, one of which is surveillance conducted with
consent. § 251 1(2)(c). Though the Court in United States v. United States Dist. Court,
supra at 304, suggested that the exemptions amounted to affirmative statutory authorization
and not a disclaimer, it never directly confronted the issue of surveillance conducted by
consent. To conclude that Congress intended to provide affirmative statutory authorization
for such surveillance seems anomalous, in light of the fact that Congress was not suffi-
ciently concerned about it to reauire, as it did for other forms of electronic surveillance, see
18 U.S.C. § 2519 (1970). that records be kept as to its use.
27 A grant of immunity does not deprive a grand jury witness of the right to object to
the illegally obtained evidence. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 45 (1972). See
also In re Buscaglia, 518 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Cohen, 358 F. Supp.
112, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The rights of grand jury witnesses conferred by Gelbard have
been held applicable to witnesses at trials. See United States v. Huss, 482 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.
1973); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1972).
28 See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). The right of a grand jury witness
to object to illegally obtained evidence on the basis of section 2515 exists independently of
the fourth amendment. Thus the decision in Gelbard was not overruled by United States v.
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ernmental affirmance of a witness's claim of illegal electronic surveil-
lance, 9 there must be a determination as to whether the surveillance
tainted the questions.3 Questions found to be tainted may not be
asked. 3'
The case law is chaotic on the question of which claims are suffi-
cient to compel the government to search its files to determine whether it
has conducted illegal electronic surveillance. The Supreme Court side-
stepped the issue in its opinion in Gelbard,32 and the circuit courts of
appeal have developed a variety of interpretations. Some opinions have
indicated that all claims compel a governmental response, regardless of
whether they have been substantiated. 33 There are, on the other hand, a
number of cases which require that claims be accompanied by supportive
evidence. 34 The value of the latter opinions is diminished, however,
because of their failure to discuss the amount or quality of the evidence
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), which held the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in-
applicable to grand jury proceedings. See United States v. Calandra, supra at 355 n.ll
(1974). See also Gelbard v. United States, supra at 45 n.5 (1972).
29 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2) & a(3), the statutory qualifications to the disclosure princi-
ple, apply to grand jury witnesses. See note 22 supra.
30 See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). See also In re Mintzer, 511
F.2d 471, 473 (Ist Cir. 1974) (sufficient for prosecutor to swear by affidavit that his
questions were not tainted by any illegal surveillance).
3 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
32 The question presented in Gelbard was whether grand jury witnesses could rely upon
18 U.S .C. § 2515 (1970) asa defense to contempt charges imposed for theirrefusal to testify.
The Court assumed that the government had acknowledged conducting illegal electronic
surveillance. 408 U.S. at 46-47. It thus was able to avoid the question of whether a sufficient
claim had been made.
11 United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972). None of these opinions is satisfactory. Evans was based on the
assumption that the government's response was relatively effortless. 452 F.2d at 1247-49.
See also In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 220 (3d Cir. 1971) (Rosenn, J., concurring), aff d on
other grounds sub nom Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). But see p. 659
and note 82 infra. In another case, some support for the claim in question already existed. See
United States v. Toscanino, supra. In Vielguth, the government had already denied having
conducted surveillance; it was therefore unnecessary for the court to decide whether the
government should be required to answer.
"' See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 n.18 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975);
United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1027 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Doe, 460
F.2d 328, 335-36 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973). See and Stevens
would require denials in good faith in response to unsupported claims, but neither would
require a search of the government files. See p. 659 infjra.
19761
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which must be produced. While it is possible that all of these courts would
consider sufficient a showing less persuasive than that required prior to the
enactment of the statute, 35 none of the opinions discussed the issues in
these terms. 3
6
A. The Word "Claim"
One approach for determining the meaning of "claim" is to focus
upon the word itself. One court has indicated that its ordinary meaning
suggests that unsubstantiated claims are acceptable. 37 It seems more ap-
propriate, however, to examine the word "cldim" in the context of the
statute in which it appears. Section 3504(a) consists of three sections,
each of which includes the word "claim." Sections (a) (2) and (a)(3),
however, deal with procedures for the disclosure of illegally obtained
evidence after the illegality has been established.3 8 Claims directed at the
inadmissibility of evidence already determined to have been illegally
obtained are by their very nature not unsubstantiated. If one assumes that
"claim" must have the same meaning in all three parts of section
3504(a), it follows that claims in section 3504(a)(1) must also be substan-
tiated. But symmetry may not have been the foremost concern of the
drafters. Indeed, caution is especially warranted where, as here, the word
is not likely to have been considered a technical term.
The use of the word "claim" in the legislative history of section
3504(a)(1) is likewise confused and contradictory. Twice on the Senate
floor 39 and once at hearings in the House of Representatives, 40 Senator
" See pp. 632-33 supra.
31 The formulation provided in United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir.
1973) applies only to claims of attorney surveillance. See also United States v. Vielguth,
502 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1974).
37 United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1974).
31 The text of section 3504(a)(1) appears at p. 633 supra. Section 3504(a) (2) reads:
"Disclosure of information for a determination if evidence is inadmissible because it is the
primary product of an unlawful act occuring prior to June 19, 1968, or because it was
obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, shall not be
required unless such information may be relevant to a pending claim of such inadmissi-
bility .. " (emphasis added). Section 3504(a)(3) reads as follows: "no claim shall be
considered that evidence of an event is inadmissible on the ground that such evidence was
obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring prior to June 19, 1968, if such
event occurred more than five years after such allegedly unlawful act." (emphasis added).
" See 116 CONG. REc. 590, 18,928 (1970).
40 Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1970).
[Vol. 11
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McClellan, the sponsor of section 3504(a)(1), substituted the phrase
"motion to suppress" for the word "claim." Since motions to suppress
require evidentiary support, 41 the substitution suggests that section
3504(a)(1) claims must also be supported. However, reliance on the use
of "motion to suppress," the meaning of which may not have been
carefully evaluated beforehand, is not clearly justified in view of the fact
that Congress did not even consider the phrase as a possible alternative
formulation. 42 Moreover, the legislative history reveals additional sub-
stitutions for the term "claim." The words "request" 41 and "charge" 4
were at times used, but neither of these terms suggests that substantiation
is required.
B. The Legislative History
Section 3504(a)(1) was largely ignored by Congress as it considered
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. 4 5 There are very few explana-
tions of the statute, and those which do appear are ambiguous. In an
attempt to clarify the meaning of the text of section 3504(a)(1) in the
course of the House hearings, Senator McClellan remarked: "The...
requirement that the government affirm or deny the occurrence of the
alleged invasion of the defendant's rights actually places a burden on the
government, rather than the defendant. ' 46 Considered by itself, this
statement seems to imply that a mere assertion by the defendant is suffi-
cient to require a government response. But when examined in the con-
text of the legislative history of which it is a part, the meaning is more
ambiguous, insofar as Senator McClellan on several occasions equated
"claim" with "motion to suppress. ' 47 An alternative interpretation of
McClellan's statement therefore might be that section 3504(a)(1) serves
"' Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) and Form 16.
42 See notes 39-40 supra.
41 See 116 CONG. REc. 35293 (1970).
41 See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1970); Hearings on S. 30
Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 166
(1970).
45 Congressional consideration of § 3504(a)(1) was overshadowed by concern with §§
3504(a)(2) and 3504(a)(3). See, e.g., Hearings on S.30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comnn. on tile Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 166-68, 314-16, 497-98 (1970).
Senators Kennedy and Hart were so strongly opposed to § 3504(a)(2) and (a)(3) that they
sought to delete § 3504 in its entirety. See 116 CoNG. REc. 952-54 (1970).
" Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on tie Judiciary,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1970).
11 See p. 638 supra.
1976]
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to guarantee a government response after the claimant has provided some
evidentiary support in the form of a motion to suppress.
48
The inclusion of section 3504(a)(1) in the Organized Crime Act of
1970 had initially been suggested by the Justice Department, which had
adopted a policy in the preceding two years of examining its files to
ascertain in all "reasonable cases ' 49 whether illegal electronic surveil-
lance had been conducted. 50 The Department recommended that its cur-
rent policy be enacted into law.5 ' The Justice Department's formulation
of its previous policy is thus another source of guidance as to the meaning
of section 3504(a)(1). However imprecise the phrase "reasonable cases"
might be, it nonetheless suggests the existence of a category of unreason-
able cases as well as some threshold for determining which cases warrant
a search of the records. 5
2
If it is assumed that Congress intended to enact without modification
the policy of the Justice Department, it would seem that the defendant or
witness must make a showing that his claim is "reasonable." But the
assumption that the enactment of section 3504(a)(1) was intended merely
to rubber-stamp the Justice Department policy is questionable. It is more
plausible that the Department's policy served instead as a catalyst for the
Congressional formulation without limiting the scope of the latter. In
describing its policy of examining its files, the Justice Department spoke
only of having conducted such examinations on behalf of defendants .53
Congress, however, drafted section 3504(a)(1) in order to allow for
claims by grand jury witnesses as well. 54 Thus, in enacting the statute,
48 Cf. Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 657 (1970) (statement of Donald L. Gainer, Deputy Chief,
Legislation and Special Projects Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, suggesting that the distinc-
tive feature of section 3504(a)(1) was that it granted greater assurance of disclosure to the
defendant than he had previously).
40 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1970) (letter from Attorney General
Kleindeinst).
50 Id. The Justice Department was not confessing continuous flagrant violations of the
law. Rather, it was admitting to electronic surveillance conducted prior to the time when
warrant procedures were required, which were subsequently held to be illegal.
51 Id.
52 In the course of describing the policy, the Attorney General stated that since "valid
allegations of the existence of unlawful electronic surveillance will decrease. . . during the
next few years... the burden on the Department will not be unacceptably heavy." S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1970) (emphasis added).
11 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138, 139, 140 (1970) (letter from Attorney
General Kelindeinst).
'4 See note 10 supra. Moreover, the conclusion by the Supreme Court in Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972), that grand jury witnesses may rely on 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(1970) as a defense to contempt charges, was based partly on the availability to them of
section 3504(a)(1). Id. at 52.
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Congress apparently went beyond Justice Department policy. Even as-
suming, therefore, that one knew the parameters of the Justice Depart-
ment's "reasonable case," it would not be appropriate to conclude that
Congress intended to adopt that standard.
The legislative history does provide, however, a number of grounds
for inferring that claims do not have to be substantiated. An evaluation of
these inferences requires some familiarity with the types of evidence
defendants and grand jury witnesses have used to support claims of illegal
electronic surveillance. Such evidence has included expert proof of the
existence of surveillance, 5" discovery of a bug, 56 and testimony of
strange noises on the telephone. 57 Less direct indications of surveillance
which have been offered as evidence include the appearance of F.B.I.
agents at meetings previously arranged by telephone,5 8 the unavailability
of telephone records (suggesting the possibility that they had been turned
over to the F.B.I.),59 and a government official's refusal to answer
questions about surveillance. 60 Sworn statements based on information
and belief that the questions asked or evidence produced could not have
been ascertained without recourse to illegal electronic surveillance have
also been offered. 61
I. The Purpose of Section 3504(a)(1)
The motivation for the enactment of section 3504(a)(1) was the
protection of victims of illegal electronic surveillance. 62 Thus it is impor-
tant to consider how a requirement that claims be substantiated would
comport with the achievement of this protection. Requiring evidentiary
support for claims of electronic surveillance is at best a modified version
of the rule laid down by Nardone v. United States63 that defendants must
11 See, e.g., Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 738 (5th Cir. 1972). See also
United States v. Flynn, 103 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff d 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955).
56 See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United
States v. McCarthy, 292 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"' United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973) (offered in support of
challenge to government's denial); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 738 (5th Cir.
1972) (same); In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 471 (3rd Cir. 1972) (same).
s See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 1973).
5 See In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1972)
60 See Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973).
61 See United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974); Bacon v. United States, 466 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1972).
62 See p. 633 supra.
63 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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prove the occurrefice of the surveillance.64 But just as the very nature of
electronic surveillance made such proof virtually impossible,6 5 so the
production of even a modicum of evidence is apt to be exceedingly
difficult. Even if the right to invoke the procedures of section 3504(a)(1)
were to require only a modest evidentiary showing, the evidence would
be largely unavailable. Furthermore, any evidentiary requirement would
foreclose arbitrarily the making of claims. Not only is much of the evi-
dence which claimants manage to procure produced by government
carelessness, 6c but expert proof of electronic surveillance is often not
obtainable, since such devices frequently cannot be detected. 67 Requiring
any evidentiary support for claims would therefore make the statute's
procedures available principally to claimants fortunate enough to have
been targets of sloppy government investigations. To give "claim" such
an interpretation would cause the statute to fall short of its goal of protect-
ing victims of illegal electronic surveillance.
The claimant who possesses compelling proof of the occurrence of
illegal electronic surveillance is not dependent upon the government's
acknowledgment of its wrongdoing. If he is a defendant, he may proceed
directly to a motion to suppress the evidence. 68 If he is a grand jury
witness, he may refuse to answer questions and rely upon 18 U.S.C. §
2515 as a defense to contempt charges. 69 Such a claimant is thus pre-
cisely the person who least needs the protection which section 3504(a)(1)
was enacted to provide. 7 0
2. The Protection of Privacy
Section 3504(a)(I) permits the ascertainment of violations of rights
of defendants and witnesses under section 2515, which prohibits the use
64 See p. 632 supra.
'. See p. 632 supra.
o See p. 641 supra.
11 See Graham. Can You Find Out if Your Telephone Is Tapped? ESQUIRE, May,
1973, at 244. It also is conceivable that if production of such evidence were required, the
government would improve its technology so that the number of claimants who might be
able to utilize such proof would progressively decrease. See In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239,
1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
68 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
69 See p. 636 supra.
70 Since the availability of evidence of illegal electronic surveillance is unpredictable,
the notion, expressed in some cases, that claims supported by extensive evidence "de-
serve" detailed government responses, whereas unsupported or poorly supported claims
warrant only vague govemment responses, is misguided. But see United States v. Stevens,
510 F.2d 1101, 1105-6 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 854 n.18 (9th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
HeinOnline -- 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.  642 1976
Wiretapping
in official proceedings of evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveil-
lance."' The Senate Report on section 3504(a)(1) makes it clear that
Congress regarded sections 3504(a)(1) and 2515 as linked statutes. 71
This linkage makes relevant an inquiry as to how a particular interpreta-
tion of section 3504(a)(1) would affect the underlying purpose of section
2515. Congress's motivation is enacting section 2515 was the protection
of the privacy of individual communication and expression.7 3 Thus it is
essential to consider the impact on the privacy of defendants and wit-
nesses of a requirement that claims be substantiated.
An examination of the types of evidence, 74 which defendants and
witnesses have produced to support their claims, reveals that some such
evidence involves disclosures of the communications which Congress
sought to protect by enacting section 2515. For example, a claimant
might allege that the questions asked or evidence produced could not have
been acquired without the use of electronic surveillance. Substantiation of
such an allegation is likely to require the claimant to supply the names of
the participants in and the subject matter of private conversations from
which the government may have procured its information. 75 Similarly, a
detailed presentation of the facts surrounding encounters with F.B.I.
agents at meetings previously arranged by telephone would seem to re-
quire a disclosure of the identity of the parties with whom one spoke and
the nature of the arrangements made. It would be ironic, and certainly not
the intention of Congress, for the privacy of defendants and witnesses to
be compromised in the course of their attempts to protect themselves from
invasions of that privacy.7 6 Moreover, in at least some cases, a require-
ment that supporting evidence accompany claims of illegal electronic
surveillance might force a claimant to reveal information of a self-
incriminating nature. 77
71 See pp. 635-37 supra.
7 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970).
71 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968). See also Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41, 51 (1972).
74 See p. 641 supra.
71 Cf. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
930 (1972).
11 Cf. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1972). But see United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). Of course, there is likely to be a greater invasion of
the defendant's privacy where he offers compromising evidence in open court rather than in
the judge's chambers.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Weinberg, 108 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1952). Defendant
was charged with falsely testifying as to his Communist affiliations. He moved to suppress
evidence on the grounds that a telephone conversation between him and the wife of a noted
Communist had been illegally wiretapped. But his defense to the charges against him
consisted in a denial of any Communist connections. Therefore in his motion to suppress he
1976]
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C. Conserving Judicial Resources
The inappropriateness of requiring evidence in support of claims
made under secton 3504(a)(1) can also be inferred from the legislative
purpose underlying sections 3504(a)(2) and 3504(a)(3). Both provisions
place limitations upon the disclosure of surveillance records7 8 in order to
reduce the amount of litigation on suppression issues.7 9 Yet a require-
ment that claimants come forward with evidence presupposes at least
some form of judicial review, since the government, as the adversary
party, cannot itself determine whether the evidence produced is suffi-
ciently compelling to warrant a response. Thus, requiring evidentiary
support for claims would entail an additional expenditure of judicial time.
The amount of time so expended would of course vary, depending upon
whether there was an adversarial hearing or merely an ex parte examina-
tion, and also upon the range of factors which the judge took into account
in making his decision.8 0 But whatever the form of the review, the fact
remains that it would entail an increase in the amount ofjudicial resources
devoted to suppression issues. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended
-o reduce the amount of suppression litigation by enacting sections
3504(a)(2) and (a)(3), only to have it increased again by the litigation
necessitated by section 3504(a)(1).Si
referred only to the "alleged" telephone conversation between himself and the wife of the
Communist. The court denied the motion to suppress because defendant had not indicated
that he had in fact been a party to an intercepted conversation.
In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the Court held that the govern-
ment could not use at trial testimony offered in support of a motion to suppress by the
defendant. While this precedent would presumably protect the defendant whose claim of
surveillance was supported by incriminating evidence relevant to the subject-matter of his
trial, it would not clearly be applicable to a defendant whose evidence did not relate to his
present trial but which nevertheless had the potential for subjecting him to additional
prosecution. Nor would the principle of Simmons be of any help to grand jury witnesses
who have not yet been indicted.
78 See note 38 supra.
79 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 954 (1970)
(statement by Sen. Hruska, co-sponsor of section 3504(a)(1)).
81 The judge might rely solely on the evidence of surveillance brought forward by the
claimant. Alternatively, he might also take into consideration various extrinsic factors. For
example, in Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973), the judge took into consideration the defendant's history
of using delaying tactics. In In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 930 (1972), the judge found the subject-matter of the grand jury inquiry to be
relevant to an assessment of the frivolousness of the claim.
81 Congress examined sections 3504(a)(2) and (a)(3) in detail. See note 45 supra. If
Congress had intended the goal of sections 3504(a)(2) and (a)(3) to be undercut by section
3504(a)(1), certainly it would have mentioned this explicitly.
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It should not be assumed, however, that section 3504(a)(1) can oper-
ate without causing delay in the trial or grand jury proceeding in which
the claim is raised, even if it is not necessary to determine whether the
claim warrants a response. Some delay is unavoidable, since the trial or
grand jury investigation must be discontinued until the claimant receives
the government's affirmance or denial. 82 Congress's enactment of sec-
tion 3504(a)(1) implies a willingness to accept the necessary conse-
quences of its operation.8 3
82 Preparation of the government's response takes approximately three weeks. Tele-
phone conversation with Marvin Loewe, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeer-
ing Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nov. 13, 1975.
83 There is nothing either on the face of section 3504(a)(1) or in any of its legislative
history which suggests when claims may be raised. The issue of timing must be resolved by
reference to the substantive rights which the statute seeks to protect and to any relevant
policy considerations.
The substantive right conferred on grand jury witnesses by the decision in Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) is, in fact, a limited one. The case merely holds that
Section 2515 provides a defense to contempt. It does not accord such witnesses the right to
move to suppress either evidence or subpoenas. Id. at 60-61. See also Cali v. United
States, 464 F.2d 475, 478 (1st Cir. 1972); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 106
(1968) (18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970), which authorizes motions by defendants to sup-
press evidence obtained by electronic surveillance, not appropriate to grand jury proceed-
ing). However, the fact that a witness has already answered some questions should not
prevent him from making a claim. The justification for not adopting a waiver notion in this
instance is that some witnesses may not suspect that their conversations have been inter-
cepted until after they have heard a number of questions. See Bacon v. United States, 466
F.2d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1972). Application of the waiver concept would encourage many
witnesses to raise section 3504(a)(1) claims early in the grand jury proceeding on the chance
that some future development would cause them to suspect electronic surveillance. More
claims would tend to be made than would otherwise be the case, thus causing unnecessary
delay in the proceedings.
Defendants are required to make any motions to suppress prior to trial, unless they are
not then aware of the grounds for the motion. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970). See also 18
U.S.C. § 2518 (9) (1970); United States v. Moon, 491 F.2d 1047, 1049 n.2 (5th Cir.
1974). The preference for having such motions made before trial is largely to afford the
government a right to appeal from orders granting such motions. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(10)(b) (1970). If the suppression hearing is postponed until the trial has begun, jeopardy
has attached. If the government loses the motion to suppress and the defendant is acquitted,
the prospect of double jeopardy will prevent appeal by the government and re-trial of the
accused. See United States v. Spagnuolo, 515 F.2d 818, 822 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975). There-
fore, defendants should be allowed to make claims of electronic surveillance under section
3504 (a)(1) prior to trial to permit the pretrial resolution of the suppression issues.
The fact that motions to suppress may be made after the trial has begun if the defendant
is not aware of the grounds beforehand implies that a defendant who seeks a government
response to a claim of electronic surveillance after his trial has begun will not have waived
his right to obtain one. Cf. United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170, 1173 n.9 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974) (claim made on 32d day of trial).
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The inevitability of such delay raises the question of whether rules
could be developed which would prevent the raising of frivolous claims.
An examination of this possibility, however, reveals that it is unwork-
able. It may seem reasonable to posit that there exist certain types of
prosecutions and investigations in furtherance of which the government
does not conduct electronic surveillance,8 4 and that therefore all claims
made with respect to such prosecutions and investigations could be barred
automatically. Even if this assumption is granted, however, it seems
clear that evidence at least potentially relevant85 to all crimes may be
obtained from electronic surveillance that was initially conducted for
other purposes. 86 Thus it does not seem possible to devise rules for the
automatic exclusion of claims of electronic surveillance.
II. CLAIMS OF ILLEGAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
OF ATTORNEY-THIRD PARTY CONVERSATIONS
A number of defendants and witnesses have attempted to use section
3504(a)(1) to ascertain whether conversations of their attorneys have been
intercepted by illegal electronic surveillance. 87 These efforts have met
with varying degrees of success, largely because the cases are split on the
question of the appropriateness of the statute for such a purpose.-88 There
is also confusion surrounding the related question of whether such claims
must be accompanied by evidentiary support. 89 To comprehend the
8 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1) (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (5) (1970).
"' It is not that most crimes involve the use of the telephone, but rather that given its
widespread use, the telephone is a potential source of information as to virtually every type
of crime which has been or may be committed.
86 Section 2517 (5) of 18 U.S.C. provides procedures for the use of electronic surveil-
lance for prosecutorial purposes other than those specified in the authorization order. This
provision is thus a clear indication that electronic surveillance is often used for purposes
beyond those for which it was originally intended. Cf. U.S. v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764,
782-83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); U.S. v. Brodson, 393 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Wis. 1975).
'1 See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 334, 340 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732,752 (5th Cir. 1972).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 1973)
(implying statute inappropriate); United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973) (same). But see United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 855-56
(9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Beverly v. United States. 468 F.2d
732, 752 n.23 (5th Cir. 1972).
SO Compare Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 738-39, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1972)
(an inability to get a dial tone on a specified telephone line used by a named attorney who at
the time was representing claimant, held sufficient to compel a government resonse) with
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sources of such uncertainty, two categories of conversations must be
distinguished: conversations between the attorney and the defendant or
witness he represents, and conversations between the attorney and third
parties concerning the defendant's or witness's case. 90 There is no ques-
tion that section 3504(a)(1) embraces claims regarding the first category
of conversations, 91 since both section 2515 and the fourth amendment
confer standing to object to the surveillance of conversations to which the
claimant was a party. 92
Neither section 2515 nor the fourth amendment, however, provides
standing for objections to surveillance of conversations between the claim-
ant's attorney and third parties even when the topic of the conversation is
the claimant's own case. 93 Yet obviously the interception of such conver-
sations may reveal evidence damaging to a defendant's case. 94 There is
also the possibility that the defendant's trial strategy may be uncovered. 95
Similarly, such interceptions may provide material for questions of wit-
nesses. 96 The potential dangers inherent in such interceptions thus make
it essential to consider, with regard to both defendants and grand jury
United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1024-26 (9th Cir. 1973) (inability of named attorney
to get dial tone on specified telephone line on specified date held insufficient). The court in
Alter held that the following information must be set out: "(1) the specific facts which
reasonably lead the affiant to believe that named counsel for the named witness has been
subjected to electronic surveillance; (2) the dates of such surveillance; (3) the outside dates
of representation of the witness by the lawyer during the period of surveillance; (4) the
identity of the person(s), by name or description, together with their respective telephone
numbers, with whom the lawyer (or his agents or employees) was communicating at the
time the claimed surveillance took place; and (5) facts showing some connection between
possible electronic surveillance and the grand jury witness who asserts the claim or the
grand jury proceeding in which the witness is involved." Id. at 1024-26. Defendants also
have been held to the Alter requirements. See, e.g., United States v. See, 505 F. 2d 845,
856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975).
9' See, e.g., United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 n.3 (9th cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 954 (1973).
92 See pp. 635-37 supra.
93 It should be noted, however, that the fourth amendment would confer standing in
this situation if the conversation took place on the claimant's premises. See Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). Standing would also be conferred under 18 U.S.C. §
2515 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1968), which indicates that
the class of those entitled to invoke section 2515 is intended to reflect the standing rules of
the fourth amendment.
91 Additionally, it may serve as a basis upon which to indict him for other crimes. See
generally Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
9' See, e.g., In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
9 See, e.g., In re Tiemey, 465 F.2d 806, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 914 (1973).
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witnesses, first, whether there exist substantive rights, the violation of
which provides standing for objections to such interceptions, and second,
assuming that there are such rights, whether the procedures mandated by
section 3504(a)(1) are appropriate for their protection.
A. Defendants
In the case of defendants, standing to object to interceptions of
attorney-third party conversations can be derived from the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel. 97 This constitutionally
mandated "assistance" has been held to include effective assistance, 98
and effective assistance, in turn, has been interpreted to require consulta-
tion free from governmental intrusion.99 Since the ultimate interest pro-
tected by the guarantee is the "privacy and confidentiality of the lawyer's
work in preparing the case," 100 the scope of the mandated privacy is not
limited to discussions in which the attorney and defendant are the sole
participants.'10 Instead it extends to conversations which the attorney has
with third parties 10 2 for the purpose'0 3 of preparing his client's legitimate
97 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel
for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9 See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942).
0' See, e.g., United States v. Rosner, 485 F. 2d 1213, 1224 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974); Coplon v. United States, 191 F. 2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952). See also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
70(1942).
200 hi re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
101 Where the defendant does participate in the discussion, he will have standing to
object to government intrusions on the basis of the fourth amendment as well as the sixth
amendment. See p. 647 supra. If neither the attorney nor the defendant participates in the
conversation, the sixth amendment protection may still apply if the conversation was held
between two intermediaries of the attorney and defendant such as to constitute a communica-
tion link between the latter two. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
102 Sometimes these third parties will be other attorneys. See, e.g., United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1220 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
The sixth amendment does not protect the defendant from private individuals who
infiltrate his meetings with his attorneys; it merely protects against governmental interfer-
ences. See Rosner, supra at 1226-27. Therefore, a defendant may not invoke the sixth
amendment if a third party divulges to the prosecution the substance of such a meeting.
However, in at least a few cases the defendant may be able to rely upon the common law
attorney-client privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE, ch.
10 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
103 The procedure for determining whether an attorney's conversation was conducted
in furtherance of his representation of his client is an in camera examination by the trial
judge of the transcript of the surveillance. See, e.g., In re Tierney, 465 F. 2d 806, 813 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973).
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defense,104 regardless of whether the defendant himself is a partici-
pant.10
5
The traditional remedy for sixth amendment violations was to give
the defendant a new trial, regardless of whether the governmental inter-
ception could be shown to have tainted the prosecution's case.' 0 6 At
present, however, the law as to the appropriate remedy is in a state of
flux.' 0 7 Recent decisions have distinguished the earlier cases as involv-
ing "gross" governmental intrusions, but have not provided a defi-
nition of "gross." 10 8 These cases have indicated that where the
government intrusion is not "gross," a new trial is appropriate only
if the defendant can show that the interception caused him prejudice. 10 9
As an alternative to a new-trial, some courts have concluded the possi-
bility of merely excluding any evidence tainted by sixth amendment
violations."10
104 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966). But see In re Terkeltoub,
256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In the latter case the court held that a discussion
between a lawyer, client, and a third party, the purpose of which was to work out the details
of a perjury scheme, was protected by the sixth amendment.
105 See Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1967); United States v. Seale,
461 F. 2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
106 See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 930 (1955); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952). See also O'Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 (1967);
Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
107 See generally Note, Government Interceptions of Attorney-Client Communica-
tions, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 87 (1974).
108 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306 (1966). See also United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
109 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 306-08 (1966) (by implication); United
States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950
(1974); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 365 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Brown,
317 F. Supp. 531, 534-35 (E.D. La. 1970). Cf. United States v. Mosca, 475 F.2d 1052
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 948 (1973). Courts have acknowledged, however, that it
may be very difficult to demonstrate taint, since the advantage the prosecution may have
obtained from access to discussions by the defense may be too subtle to pinpoint. See
United States v. Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1228 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950
(1974). See also State v. Cory, 62 Wash.2d 371,382 P.2d 1019 (1963).
Some courts have noted that there may be cases where the taint is so pervasive
that a new trial would not accord the defendant sufficient protection; in such cases,
dismissal of the charges would be necessary. See Hoffa v. United States, supra
at 308; United States v. Rosner, supra at 1228. See also State v. Cory, supra at
376, 382 P.2d at 1022-23.
110 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 308-309 (1966); United States v.
Rosner, 485 F.2d 1213, 1228 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 950 (1974).
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B. Grand Jury Witnesses
While defendants may rely upon the sixth amendment"' to give
them standing to object to governmental interception of their attorneys'
conversations, the legal status of identical objections made by grand jury
witnesses is highly precarious. 1 2 The reason for this is that the two
potential sources for standing of grand jury witnesses prove to be illusory.
The sixth amendment is one potential sourcefor standing. However,
the text of the amendment'la presents a formidable barrier to the applica-
tion of its "right to counsel" clause to grand jury proceedings." 4 The
phrases "counsel for his defense" and "all criminal prosecutions" would
seem to preclude the inclusion of the grand jury, whose investigation
ordinarily'1 5 precedes the initiation of any formal prosecution. Thus, the
Supreme Court has held the "assistance of counsel" clause inapplicable
prior to the indictment of the accused. "16 One justification for holding the
III Defendants are also protected by the fifth amendment, since the accused's sixth
amendment right to counsel has been incorporated within the fifth amendment due process
clause. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952); Neufield v. United States, 118 F.2d 375,383 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 798 (1942).
,12 Two cases have stated specifically that grand jury witnesses have standing to object
to electronic surveillance of their attorneys but neither identified the substantive basis for
such standing. See Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 751 (5th Cir. 1972); In re
Tiemey, 465 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973). But see
United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548, 549 n.3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954
(1973).
13 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI.
114 Justice Burger has maintained that the language of the sixth amendment simply will
not permit such a construction. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1970)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"1 But see In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
116 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (sixth amendment right to counsel held not
to apply to a post-arrest, pre-indictment confrontation between the accused and victims).
There is no right to counsel even after indictment unless the context is such that the accused
requires legal advice. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (right to counsel not
applicable at a post-indictment photographic display).
The Supreme Court has held that a witness does not have the right to the presence of an
attorney in the grand jury room. Anon. v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330, 333 (1957). See also United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6tfi Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 11
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right to counsel clause applicable to grand jury witnesses is the need to
insure that the witness's responses to questions do not unwittingly11 7
compromise any of his rights. 118 However, the present trend of Supreme
Court decisions appears to limit the application of the right to counsel
clause, 1 9 thus suggesting that the Court is unlikely to adopt such an
expansive view of the sixth amendment.
A second potential source of standing for grand jury witnesses is the
fifth amendment's due process clause, the scope of which is not limited to
those accused of crime.' 20 Several Supreme Court opinions have stated
specifically that the due process clause protects unindicted individuals
from prejudicial procedures utilized in criminal investigations.1 2' As-
sessment of contentions that such procedures constitute a denial of due
process is based on the "totality of the circumstances,' 1 2 2 and involves
balancing the harm to the victim against the government's interest in
efficient investigations of crime.123 However, the very concept of due
However, the courts have permitted the witness to consult with counsel outside the grand
jury room during the questioning. Some decisions have deemed this a right. See, e.g.,
United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989
(1969). But some courts have restricted either the frequency of consultation or the amount
of time permitted for it. See, e.g., In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 810-11 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973).
117 There is some implicit support for this view in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
313 (1973), where the Court stated that only in proceedings where the accused requires
advice in coping with legal problems is the application of the sixth amendment's right to
counsel clause appropriate.
118 Grand jury witnesses are protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and by statutory and common law privileges. A witness is also protected by
the fourth amendment against subpoenas duces tecum, the demands of which are unreason-
able. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974). See also In re Berry, 521
F.2d 179, 181-83 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 30 (1975).
119 In 1967 the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel clause was applicable to a
pretrial line-up. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967). In 1972 the Supreme Court limited these cases and held that the right to
counsel did not apply until after indictment even if the accused had already been arrested.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). In 1973 the Court imposed an additional limitation,
holding that the right to counsel clause was inapplicable even after indictment, unless the
proceeding was one in which legal advice was necessary. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300(1973).
12o See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Dent v. West Va., 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
121 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
301-2 (1967).
122 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972). See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 301-2 (1967).
123 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
301-2 (1967).
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process is so nebulous that a witness would likely be forced to de-
monstrate enormous prejudice to himself from the surveillance in order to
establish that due process has been denied.1 24 Hence, even if courts
would be willing to apply the due process clause to electronic surveillance
of the attorneys of grand jury witnesses, probably all but the most egre-
gious intrusions would be upheld.
Thus, neither the fifth amendment's due process clause nor the sixth
amendment can be relied on as a source of standing for witnesses to
object to the interception of their attorneys' conversations. Indeed, any
possibility that these amendments might provide the basis for a witness's
refusal to answer questions derived from illegal electronic surveillance 125
would seem to have been foreclosed by the 1974 Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Calandra .126 The Court's holding in Calandra that
there is no constitutional requirement in grand jury proceedings for the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
would seem to apply with equal force to the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the fifth amendment's due process clau"' or the
sixth amendment's right to counsel clause. 127
To appreciate the inevitability of such an application, it is necessary
to note that Calandra held only that there is no constitutional necessity in
grand jury proceedings for the fourth amendment exclusionary rule; the
Court did not hold that the fourth amendment itself had no place in grand
jury proceedings. Indeed, the opinion specifically notes that a grand jury
witness has standing to object to a subpoena duces tecum on the grounds
that compliance would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure
under the fourth amendment.' 2 8 In the latter situation, the Court
explained, the constitutional violation would be prevented prior to its
occurrence by means of judicial intervention. The function of the
exclusionary rule, on the other hand, is to bar evidence which has already
been procured illegally. In other words, Calandra precludes only the
retrospective, but not the prospective, application of the fourth amend-
124 Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v.
Washington, 504 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1974).
12 Grand jury witnesses of course have the right to refuse to answer self-incriminating
questions. See note 118 supra.
126 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Prior to Calandra two cases held that grand jury witnesses
had standing to object to electronic surveillance of their attorneys. See In re Tierney, 465
F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973); Beverly v. United
States, 468 F.2d 732, 751 (5th Cir. 1972). See also note 112 supra.
127 See pp. 652-53 infra.
128 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
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ment to the grand jury. Moreover, the Court strongly implied that there is
also no necessity in the grand jury for the retrospective application of any
constitutional right; indeed, the Court devotes a full page to a discussion
of the prospective nature of the constitutional and statutory rights of grand
jury witnesses. 12 9 A number of examples of such rights are provided,
thus making clear that the remarks are not limited to the fourth amend-
ment. The discussion concludes with the statement that remedying the
violation of these rights after the fact (i.e., by means of an exclusionary
rule) is not constitutionally required; only where it is possible to prevent
the violation in advance is judicial intervention appropriate. 130
Yet it is only the retrospective, and not the prospective application of
the fifth and sixth amendments which would be relevant to the grand jury
witness who sought to refuse to answer questions thought to be derived
from illegal electronic surveillance. The constitutional violation has al-
ready occurred by the time the witness is questioned, and judicial inter-,
vention after the fact cannot serve a preventive function. 13 1 Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that the Court would regard a sixth amend-
ment exclusionary rule in the grand jury setting more favorably than the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' 32 Indeed, the Court has on several
occasions expressed a general resistance to the interruption of grand jury
proceedings for any reason, including the vindication of constitutional
rights.' 33
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 The Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), specifically rejected
the theory that the asking of questions based on evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment constituted a "fresh and independent violation of the witness's constitutional
rights." Id. at 353-54.
132 The Supreme Court has reserved judgment as to whether even an equivalent
standard of exclusion should apply under the sixth amendment as under the fourth. See
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309 (1966). See also United States v. Vielguth, 502
F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974) (sixth amendment rights seen as less important than fourth
amendment rights). With regard to the fifth amendment, the Court in United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) said that indictments are not challengeable on the grounds
that they were procured through the violation of the defendant's fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Id. at 344-45. This has been interpreted as meaning, at least for
the purposes of grand jury proceedings, that the fifth amendment does not supercede the
fourth amendment in importance. In re Weir, 495 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419U.S. 1038 (1974).
1"3 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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C. Section 3504(a)(1) and the Sixth Amendment
Though grand jury witnesses do not possess substantive rights which
confer standing to object to the illegal electronic surveillance of their
attorneys, defendants have standing to make such objections on the
basis of the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel. 134
Thus the remaining consideration is whether defendants may utilize
section 3504(a)(1) to compel the government to affirm or deny whether
their attorneys' conversations have been intercepted.
The text of the statute135 indicates that claims must be made by a
"party aggrieved." While the legislative history is silent as to the mean-
ing of this phrase, a statement in the Senate Report indicates that case law
principles of standing determine who may utilize section 3504(a)(1).' 36
Since the case law acknowledges that electronic surveillance of a defen-
dant's attorney may violate the defendant's sixth amendment rights and
thus confer standing upon him,1 37 it seems reasonable to infer that the
statute can encompass sixth amendment claims.
The statute further indicates that the "party aggrieved" must claim
that "evidence is inadmissible." The use of such language may at first
appear to preclude claims of sixth amendment violations, since the tradi-
tional remedy in such cases has been a new trial, rather than the exclusion
of evidence. 138 But more recent cases have conceded that it is appropriate
in at least some instances to exclude evidence tainted by sixth amendment
violations.139 Moreover, there is precedent for a liberal interpretation of
134 See pp. 648-49 supra.
135 See p. 633 supra.
136 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970). The Report cites two
fourth amendment cases as examples. Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969);
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
137 See pp. 648-49 supra.
138 See p. 649 supra.
130 See p. 649 supra. See also United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 365-66 (7th
Cir. 1972). To enable the defendant to show taint in this context, some courts have found
relevant the principle of Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), that surveillance
which violates the fourth amendment must be disclosed to the defendant to permit him to
demonstrate that the surveillance tainted his trial. See United States v. Seale, supra, at
365-66. See also United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974).
The relevance of the Alderman disclosure principle to the sixth amendment context is a
further indication of the appropriateness of using § 3504(a)(1) for sixth amendment claims.
Section 3504(a)(2) of 18 U.S.C. which imposes limits upon the principle of disclosure
mandated by Alderman, was designed to apply to those claims made under section
3504(a)(1) which the govemment affirms. See H. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51
(1970). Clearly, the application of Section 3504(a)(2) to claims of sixth amendment viola-
tions which are affirmed is possible only if the Alderman principle is considered relevant to
violations of the sixth amendment.
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the phrase "evidence is inadmissible" as used in section 3504(a)(1). The
Supreme Court in Gelbard held that the phrase could be read to encom-
pass the inadmissibility of a witness's testimony .140
The statute indicates that for evidence to be inadmissible, it must
have been derived from an "unlawful act." Section 3504(b) defines an
"unlawful act" as the use of an electronic device in violation of the
Constitution or of federal law.14 1 This definition indicates no restriction
as to which portion of the Constitution the act must violate, and thus
makes plausible the inference that sixth amendment violations are in-
cluded. 142 The language of section 3504(a)(1) thus presents no bar to the
making of sixth amendment claims.
Moreover, nothing in the legislative history refutes the idea that the
procedures of section 3504(a)(1) are applicable to sixth amendment
claims. Section 3504(a)(1) was adapted from a Justice Department policy
dating back to at least 1966.143 This policy constitutes an important basis
for inferring the scope of the statute which it generated. 144 An examina-
tion of Justice Department admissions of illegal electronic surveillance
between 1966 and 1970 reveals that in at least three cases the Justice
140 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 54 (1972).
141 See note 16 supra.
142 The constitutional and statutory requirements for judicial approval of electronic
surveillance are based on the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Berger v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The statutory requirements for electronic
surveillance contained within 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) were designed to conform to
the constitutional mandates of Katz and Berger. See S. RaP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 66 (1968). The cases concerning sixth amendment violations caused by the electronic
surveillance of defendants' attorneys have all involved surveillance which failed to comply
with the requirements mandated by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United
States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); Coplon
v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
The presence of fourth amendment violations in these cases is to be distinguished from
the question of whether the defendants possessed standing to object to such violations. For
example, in Hoffa, one petitioner possessed fourth amendment standing and the restdid not.
All, however, were held entitled to object to any sixth amendment violation. Id. at 233. No
case has presented squarely the issue of whether electronic surveillance which does not
violate the fourth amendment may nevertheless violate the sixth amendment if the surveil-
lance intrudes upon discussions of the defendant's attorney relevant to the defendant's case.
See Tierney v. United States, 409 U.S. 1232 (1972).
1.1 See p. 640 supra; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 138 (1970).
144 The argument was made earlier that the meaning of "claim" suggested by the
Justice Department's policy should not limit its meaning in the context of section
3504(a)(1). See p. 640 supra. This argument was justified because there was consid-
erable evidence that Congress intended to expand it. Id. The present argument relies
upon the absence of any Congressional intention to narrow the Justice Department policy.
There is thus no inconsistency between the present argument and the argument made earlier.
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Department singled out for special concern the occurrence or possible
occurrence of sixth amendment violations. 145 Furthermore, it seems clear
that the Congressional purpose of protecting victims of illegal electronic
surveillance 146 is enhanced by interpreting section 3504(a)(1) to include
sixth amendment claims. As former Justice Douglas put it, " [t]he conver-
sation of one's lawyer over the telephone may be as helpful to Big Brother
as the conversation of the accused [himself]." 147
Finally, there is no reason to require even a low threshold of eviden-
tiary support for sixth amendment claims made under the statute. First,
the extreme difficulty in amassing any evidence of electronic surveillance
militates against such a requirement. 148 Second, even a low evidentiary
threshold would necessitate some form of judicial review to ascertain
whether the threshold has been met in a particular case. But since Con-
gress enacted sections 3504(a)(2) and (a)(3) to decrease the amount of
judicial time spent on suppression issues, it is unlikely that it intended to
have it replaced by litigation made necessary by section 3504(a)(1). 1 49
Third, the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel protects
the defendant's attorney from government intrusion into the preparation
of his client's case. 150 A defendant who sought to show that evidence
produced against him could not have been acquired without the electronic
surveillance of his attorney may have no alternative but to provide the
government with the subject matter of at least some of his attorney's
conversations. Yet the production of such evidence compromises the very
integrity of the consultations he is seeking to protect. 151
For these reasons claims of electronic surveillance of the defendant's
attorney, like claims of the surveillance of the defendant himself, should
not require evidentiary support. As with claims of surveillance of the
"' See Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231 (1967); O'Brien v. United States, 386
U.S. 345, 346, 347 (1967); Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966). See also Schipani
v. United States, 385 U.S. 372 (1966).
146 See p. 641 supra.
147 Heutsche v. United States, 414 U.S. 898, 899 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
148 See p. 642 supra.
140 Id.
IS' See pp. 648-49 supra.
15' Cf. Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 926 (1952). It might be possible to have only the judge see such evidence. Cf.
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1961). However, none of the cases
which have required evidentiary support for claims of attorney surveillance have adopted
such an approach. See, e.g., United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 1973).
Furthermore, even if such an approach were adopted, the other problems discussed at
p. 656 supra would remain.
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defendant, 152 it is impossible to develop a set of rules which would prevent
the raising of tenuous claims, for there is no category of cases in which the
possibility of electronic surveillance of attorneys can be dismissed with
certainty. However, the very nature of the alleged sixth amendment
violation does suggest one limiting principle. Since the violation consists
of an interference with the attorney's representation of the defendant, the
violation cannot occur prior to the start of such representation. The defen-
dant could be required to attach to his claim the period of representation by
the attorney in question,' 53 an approach which has been followed in
several cases. 1 54 In responding to the claim, the government will be
concerned only with verifying the occurrence of electronic surveillance
conducted within a limited time frame; thus the investigation will be
expedited, and delay in the trial proceedings can be minimized.
III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO CLAIMS OF
ILLEGAL ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The confusion in the case law with regard to the interpretation of
section 3504(a)(1) is not confined to the requirements for making claims
of illegal electronic surveillance. It also extends to the nature of the
government's required response to such claims, that is, the significance
of the obligation to "affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged unlaw-
ful act."' 5 5
One source of uncertainty is the question of how the government
should respond when it has conducted electronic surveillance which it
believes to be legal.156 The argument has been made that since the claim
is directed at illegal surveillance, the government should not have to
152 See p. 646 supra.
153 Revelation of the name of defendant's attorney and the dates of his representation
have been held not to violate the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship. See,
e.g., United States v. Pappadio, 346 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 384
U.S. 364 (1966); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Dickinson, 308 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff d, 421 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam). But see Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir. 1973). See also
Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 738-39, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1972).
"' See note 135 supra.
1"6 See, e.g., Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 752 n.23 (5th Cir. 1972) (not
necessary to include such surveillance). But see In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 471 (3rd Cir.
1972) (all such surveillance should be included).
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acknowledge surveillance it considers to be legal. 157 This argument is
specious for severaf reasons. First, the decision as to whether the surveil-
lance was conducted lawfully is a legal decision, to be distinguished from
the factual question of whether there was any surveillance at all. Since
ultimate legal judgments should not be made by one of the adversaries in
a controversy, a conclusory denial by the government should be unac-
ceptable.1 58 Second, the Senate Report on section 3504(a)(1) provides
clear support for the position that the government must acknowledge
electronic surveillance which it considers to be legal. Indeed, the Report
expressed the expectation that questions concerning the legality of court-
ordered electronic surveillance' 59 and surveillance conducted pursuant to
the national security exception would repeatedly arise under the stat-
ute. 160
157 Cf. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
158 Neither the text of section 3504(a)(1) nor its legislative history directs itself to the
right of a claimant to challenge the government's denials to claims of illegal electronic
surveillance, and a detailed examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this Comment.
However, it should be noted that there are in fact three types of challenge which a claimant
might wish to make.
First, a claimant might attack the government's assertion that the surveillance was
legal. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(I0)(a) (1970); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974).
See also United States v. Crabtree, 475 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Robinson, 472 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court in Gelbard v. United States,
408 U.S. 41 (1972), reserved the question as to whether grand jury witnesses might make
such a challenge, Id. at 61 n.22. However, In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803 (lst Cir. 1974),
accorded grand jury witnesses a limited right to make such a challenge. But see United
States v. Worobyzt, 522 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1975).
Second, a claimant might challenge the sufficiency of the government's denial as a
matter of law. See Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973) (unsworn denial
challenged); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914
(1973) (challenge to the number of agencies contacted).
Third, a claimant might wish to challenge the truth of the government's assertion that
no electronic surveillance was conducted. A defendant who wished to make this challenge
would probably have to establish the occurrence of the surveillance in accordance with the
burden of proof laid down by Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). See also
United States v. Ledesma, 499 F.2d 36 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). In
his concurrence in Gelbard, Justice White suggests that grand jury witnesses may not
challenge the truth of a denial. 408 U.S. at 71 (White, J., concurring). But see Korman v.
United States, sipra; United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1027 n.19 (9th Cir. 1973).
151 In some categories of electronic surveillance, no case has held that court orders are
required. These are surveillance conducted with the consent of one of the parties to the
conversation, and foreign national security surveillance. Domestic national security surveil-
lance does, however, require prior judicial approval. See United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See also notes 22 and 26 supra.
1 0 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1970).
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Because a United States District Attorney is often not aware of the
source of leads provided by other government agencies, 161 an adequate
government response to a claim of illegal electronic surveillance must
include statements from government officials in Washington.1 62 There is
some confusion in the cases as to the appropriate manner of selecting the
federal agencies from which such statements are solicited. The majority
view requires only that inquiries be directed at the seven agencies which
have obtained permission from the Justice Department to conduct elec-
tronic surveillance pursuant to a court order.' 6 3 A minority position is
that any other agency with responsibility for the subject matter of the case
should also be contacted .' 4 The minority position is preferable for two
reasons. First, the majority view assumes that electronic surveillance is
conducted only by those agencies specifically authorized to utilize it,
and thus ignores electronic surveillance that is blatantly illegal. Other
apparently lawful surveillance may nevertheless be illegal because of an
isolated defect, such as the continuation of the surveillance beyond the
period authorized by the court.' 65 If only those agencies which have
received permission to conduct electronic surveillance are contacted, it is
likely that the only incidents of illegality which will emerge will be of the
second type. But certainly there ought to be at least as much concern with
the occurrence of blatantly illegal surveillance. Second, an inquiry di-
rected only at those agencies permitted to conduct surveillance pursuant
to court order may overlook those forms of electronic surveillance which
do not require judicial approval.
161 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966). Occasionally the fact that
information was obtained from electronic surveillance will be denoted by a code to which
the prosecuting attorney is not privy. See, e.g., United States v. Alderisio, 424 F.2d 20, 24
n.6 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
afj'd, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970).
162 See, e.g., United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170, 1173 n. 10 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 914 (1973); In re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
But see Bufalino v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728, 732 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
163 These agencies are the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; Internal
Revenue Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Customs Service; Drug
Enforcement Administration; and Postal Service. See, e.g., United States v. Grusse, 515
F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
See also 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
164 In United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1027 (9th Cir. 1973), the government
response was criticized for failing to justify limiting the inquiry to the agencies which
received permission from the Justice Department to conduct electronic surveillance.
161 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1970).
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Most courts have required that the government response be in the
form of a sworn affidavit. 166 This requirement is desirable both as a
symbolic recognition of the importance of the response and to insure
greater care on the part of those responsible for the preparation of
answers. Courts have also insisted that the government's answer indicate
which agencies were contacted,' 1 67 a requirement which is essential to the
ascertainment of whether all relevant agencies were reached. 168 Some
courts have required only that the government reply incorporate the sub-
stance of the responses from the government agencies;1 69 in at least one
case, however, the prosecution appended copies of the letters received
from the agencies.' 7 ° The latter approach seems preferable, as the filter-
ing inherent in summarizing the various responses may serve to obscure
any ambiguity or uncertainty in any one of the responses.
CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS OF THE STATUTE
By providing a mechanism for the discovery of illegal electronic
surveillance, section 3504(a)(1) is an important device for barring the use
of evidence obtained by such means. At the same time, however, there
are certain limitations inherent in the procedures which it establishes.
First, the successful functioning of the procedures presupposes that
the government will willingly admit to its own wrongdoing. But such an
assumption may not be justified. While in a number of cases litigated
before the statute was enacted, the government acknowledged having
conducted illegal electronic surveillance,17 1 the government was free to
choose whether and when it would make such admissions. Section
3504(a)(1) raises the question of whether the government will be willing
to acknowledge illegality whenever others ask it to do so. The govern-
16' See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d
1101, 1106 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170, 1174 n.12 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855 (1974).
167 See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 281 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal.
1974). But see United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975).
I" Cf. In re Tiemey, 465 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914
(1973).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973).
170 In re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1974). There was no indication that
the court required this procedure.
171 See, e.g., Giordano v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Markis v. United
States, 387 U.S. 425 (1967).
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ment's reluctance to admit having conducted illegal electronic surveil-
lance in a particular case may be compounded by the fact that Congress
has enacted statutes which provide heavy criminal and civil penalties for
the illegal use of electronic surveillance.' 72 Indeed, in its decision in
Gelbard, the Supreme Court acknowledged that failure to obtain appro-
priate authorization for electronic surveillance might result in the trials of
government prosecutors themselves.aT3
Despite these problems, however, there appears to be no alternative
to relying upon the government's acknowledgement of its own illegal
activities. For only the government has access to the relevant informa-
tion: "The government is handicapped ...because [it has] too many
records. Yet that is little comfort to [the claimant], who has none.' '1 74
However, section 3504(a)(1) would still provide significant protections if
it is read to compel disclosure of surveillance which the government,
believes to be legal.' 7 5 Indeed, it is inevitable that in at least some of
these cases the courts will conclude that such surveillance was nonethe-
less illegal.' 76 Thus, certain prophylactic protections would remain.
The second limitation is the inefficient method by which the infor-
mation necessary for the government's response is obtained from the
various federal agencies. The Department of Justice is informed by the
prosecuting attorney that a claim of illegal electronic surveillance has
been made. The Department, in turn, sends letters to the appropriate
agencies, and forwards the replies it receives to the prosecuting attor-
ney.' 7 7 An alternative method would be the establishment of a central,
'72 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (1970), providing fines of not more than $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, for the prohibited interception of wire or
oral communications; 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970), authorizing the recovery of civil damages
for anyone whose communication is illegally intercepted. Such a person is entitled to actual
damages, punitive damages, and litigation costs.
173 408 U.S. 41, 52 (1972). Two complete defenses to any civil or criminal action are
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). The first is a good faith reliance on a court order.
The second is good faith reliance upon the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970), which
allows for the interception of communications without a court order in emergency situations
if authorization is obtained within forty-eight hours after the interception. It is conceivable
that the government prosecutor might plead the fifth amendment rather than affirm the
occurrence of illegal electronic surveillance.
174 In re Evans, 452, F.2d 1239, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930
(1972).
175 See pp. 657-58 supra.
176 Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Benanti v. United States, 355
U.S. 96 (1957).
177 Telephone conversation with Marvin Loewe, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and
Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nov. 13, 1975.
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computerized record of all electronic surveillance conducted by the gov-
emment .'7  The 6stablishment of such a computer bank would serve to
streamline the series of separate inquiries made necessary by the present
system. However, its establishment might at the same time threaten pri-
vacy far more than does the present system. The very existence of a such
a computer bank would make the information contained within it avail-
able for pernicious purposes; thus the present fragmentation of informa-
tion regarding electronic surveillance is to this extent protective.1 7 9
Both the fourth amendment and section 2515 allow challenges to
illegal electronic surveillance conducted by state officials.' 80 However,
there is nothing in the legislative history of section 3504(a)(1) to indicate
that the federal government is required to determine whether the state
government has conducted any electronic surveillance for which the
claimant has standing to object.' 8 ' But since state and federal officials
involved in the prosecution of crime may share information obtained from
electronic surveillance,18 2 the possibility exists that in some instances the
federal government's case was constructed at least in part on the basis of
electronic surveillance conducted by the state. At least where the federal
government is aware of the fact that its evidence was obtained in this
manner, it should be required to acknowledge this in its response. Such a
requirement would not obligate the federal government to make any
inquiries to determine this fact, nor would it be inconsistent with the
government's obligation to affirm or deny the use of electronic surveil-
lance allegedly in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 83
178 See It re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
170 The comprehensiveness of the government's records is questionable. See United
States v. Ahmad, 347 F, Supp. 912, 935 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds sub noin. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1973).
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. 2518(8)(a) (1970) mandates various procedures for the safekeeping
of the tapes of electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to authority granted by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1970). The purpose is to avoid "editing or other alterations." See §
2518(8)(a). Thus electronic surveillance for which the authorization does not derive from 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) need not conform to these provisions. See note 26 supra.
180 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970).
101 See In re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
182 Congress recognized and specifically encouraged such sharing of information in 18
U.S.C. § 2517 (1970).
183 To be sure, there will probably be cases in which the federal government is
unaware that some of the evidence it receives from state authorities was derived from
electronic surveillance. But the significance of this phenomenon will of course depend on
the frequency with which it occurs. Two related issues are how to determine which state
governments to contact and whether a claimant can be permitted to make a showing that an
inquiry of state government regarding electronic surveillance is warranted in his case. See
generally li re Harris, 383 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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The enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1970) provides an essen-
tial tool for the realization of constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against the use of evidence obtained from illegal electronic surveillance.
This Comment has analyzed how alternative interpretations of section
3504(a)(1) comport with the protection of rights under the fourth and
sixth amendments and under 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970). The successful
functioning of this statute is nonetheless uncertain, since success depends
upon the government's willingness to acknowledge its own wrongdoing.
-Margaret V. Sachs
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